Abstract-This paper studies the role of business cycles in the phenomenon of increasing government-spending/GDP ratios in the OECD countries. An empirical framework that includes both long-run and cyclical considerations in the determination of government spending is applied to panel data covering . The main finding is that the prolonged rise in the spending/GDP ratio is partially explained by cyclical upward ratcheting due to asymmetric fiscal behavior: the ratio increases during recessions and is only partially reduced in expansions. The long-run ratcheting effect is estimated as approximately 2% of GDP. Also analyzed are the cyclical changes in the composition of government spending (government consumption, transfers and subsidies, and capital expenditure), as well as a possible link between cyclical ratcheting and government weakness.
I. Introduction

G
OVERNMENT spending in the OECD countries has risen from an average of 27.4% of GDP in 1974 to 35.9% in 1998 , that is, by 8.5 percentage points. The share of government spending in output has been rising since the beginning of the twentieth century. 1 However, from the middle 1970s the spending drift has been accompanied by deficits and a growing public debt. This feature was linked in the literature to political and institutional mechanisms. For example, von Hagen and Harden (1996) and Alesina and Perotti (1999) studied the influence of budgetary institutions, and Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) addressed electoral rules and the structure of parties and governments.
The hypothesis tested in this paper is that asymmetric government spending over the business cycle leads to upward cyclical ratcheting in government spending. The mechanism underlying this hypothesis-as described in Buchanan and Wagner (1978) -is that while countercyclical policy is conducted in recessions, high tax revenues in expansions make it difficult for governments to resist pressure from interest groups to reduce spending symmetrically. The results indicate that cyclical ratcheting of government spending in the OECD countries can explain a long-run increase of approximately 2% of GDP.
The cyclical pattern of government expenditure in industrial economies has been studied by Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1995) , Gavin and Perotti (1997) , Talvi and Vegh (2000) , and others. In particular, Gavin and Perotti present evidence of asymmetrical fiscal behavior over the cycle: government consumption is moderately procyclical in expansions, whereas in contractions government consumption and transfers are strongly countercyclical. The contribution of this paper to this literature is to test the link between this asymmetry and the spending/output drift.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents an empirical framework for the dynamic determination of government spending. Section III reports the results regarding total government spending, and in particular the estimate of a cyclical ratcheting coefficient. Section IV decomposes government spending into its main components-government consumption, transfers and subsidies, and capital expenditure-in order to analyze the differential impact of cyclical ratcheting. Section V reports two additional tests. The first is whether cyclical ratcheting is related to government weakness, and the second is whether there was a regime change in the determination of government spending during the early 1990s. Section VI contains concluding remarks.
II. Dynamic Determination of the GovernmentSpending/Output Ratio
In the following framework the dynamics of government spending are determined by (1) basic considerations (longrun equalization of marginal benefit to marginal cost) and (2) cyclical considerations. The specification is empirically oriented, aimed at the estimation of the degree to which cyclical spending behavior affects the long-run level of the government-spending/output ratio, denoted as g t ϭ g t /y t .
A. Basic Considerations
The basic criterion affecting the dynamics of g is the long-run equalization of marginal benefit to marginal cost from the policymaker's point of view-which may or may not coincide with those of society. Long-run marginal benefit is specified as ␤(␥ Ϫ g t ), ␥, ␤ Ͼ 0. Marginal benefit decreases with g t , and ␥ is the bliss level beyond which government expenditures have negative marginal benefit. Marginal cost is formulated as c ϩ g t , c, Ͼ 0. Increasing marginal cost may follow from the marginal deadweight loss of taxation, or from a relative price response to government demand.
The basic dynamics are formulated as
where ⌬ indicates the growth rate and 0 Ͻ Ͻ ϱ. The spending/output ratio increases when the marginal benefit exceeded the marginal cost in the previous period (decreases in the opposite case). The positive but finite nature of captures adjustment costs in changing g. Equating marginal benefit to marginal cost yields the basic long-run
In the context of the basic considerations, an increasing spending/output ratio-as in the OECD since 1974-could be rationalized by an upward shift in ␤ or ␥ or by a downward shift in c at that time, triggering a process of convergence to a higher g*.
B. Cyclical Considerations
where ⌬y is the average growth rate and
the cyclical spending behavior is specified as
The coefficients ␣ 1 and ␣ 2 capture the spending pattern in expansions and contractions, respectively. The cyclical pattern of government spending may have two alternative forms: (a) symmetric behavior in expansions and contractions, (b) asymmetric behavior.
Symmetric Behavior: In this case, g reacts in the same way to (⌬y t ) p and to (⌬y t ) n , that is, ␣ 1 ϭ ␣ 2 ϭ ␣. When ␣ ϭ 0, the evolution of g is unrelated to the cycle. If ␣ Ͼ 0, g increases in expansions and decreases in contractions (procyclical), and vice versa (countercyclical) when ␣ Ͻ 0. 2 A special case is ␣ ϭ Ϫ1, where cyclical spending collapses to constant growth at the average growth rate of output. 3 In the terminology of Buchanan and Wagner (1978) , symmetric cyclical spending can result from the implementation of Keynesian economic policies in an idealized environment-that is, policies that would be implemented by a benevolent Keynesian planner who is free of short-sighted considerations. This planner would generate deficits in recessions by increasing spending, and symmetric surpluses in expansions by reducing spending. In principle, this type of behavior could reflect, for example, an optimal cyclical pattern of public investment, or unemployment benefits that produce a more efficient job search.
Asymmetric Behavior: Buchanan and Wagner stress the asymmetry that emerges from attempting to implement Keynesian economic policies in a realistic environment, in which policy is also affected by short-sighted considerations. Increasing spending during recessions is likely to be politically attractive. In expansions, however, a symmetric reduction of spending is hard to implement, because tax revenues abound: powerful interest groups, which may represent acute needs from their own point of view, are unlikely to be convinced that available tax revenues should be put aside because that is the right time to be thrifty.
The asymmetric behavior described above implies that ␣ 1 Ͼ ␣ 2 . In this case, fluctuations in output growth are accompanied by an increasing spending/output ratio over time. The quantitative importance of this mechanism can be measured by the ratcheting coefficient ϵ ␣ 1 Ϫ ␣ 2 . 4 
C. Empirical Formulation
The basic and the cyclical considerations are included together in the regression equation
where ␣ 0 ϭ (␤␥ Ϫ c), ϭ Ϫ(␤ ϩ ), and ε t is a white noise error. 5 To illustrate the ratcheting mechanism, let us consider the following example, which can be taken as a benchmark case. Assume that the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to output is 1. In expansions all additional tax revenue is spent, and hence, given unit elasticity of tax revenue, g remains constant. This implies that ␣ 1 ϭ 0. In recessions, spending grows at the normal rate, and correspondingly ␣ 2 ϭ Ϫ1. In this case, the ratcheting coefficient is ␣ 1 Ϫ ␣ 2 ϭ 1. In terms of the drift of g over time, after two years with (⌬y t ) p ϭ 0.01 in one and ⌬y t n ϭ Ϫ0.01 in the other, the spending/output ratio is higher than previously by 1%.
2 Under this definition, expansions and contractions are relative to average growth, whereas in the standard definition they are relative to 0 (that is, an expansion is a movement from trough to peak, ⌬y t Ͼ 0, and a contraction is a movement from peak to trough, ⌬y t Ͻ 0). The definition adopted here has the characteristic that expansions and contractions average over time to 0. An analysis based on the standard definition of expansions and contractions is reported in appendix C.
3 To see this, note that when ␣ 1 ϭ ␣ 2 ϭ Ϫ1,
Hence, (⌬g t ) c ϭ ⌬y. When ␣ Ͻ Ϫ1, (⌬g t ) c Ͼ ⌬y in recessions and (⌬g t ) c Ͻ ⌬y in expansions. 4 The spending behavior in expansions is related to the flypaper effect, which refers to the finding that grants to state and local governments in the United States encourage their spending much more than could be predicted from income effects. See Hines and Thaler (1995) for a survey and interpretation of this phenomenon. Cyclical ratcheting can be seen as a combination of countercyclical policy with flypaper behavior in booms, which renders spending behavior asymmetric over the cycle.
5 Stationarity of g requires that is negative, as the current framework predicts. A problem with panel data regressions of this type is that the estimate of is biased toward stationarity. This bias is large when the length of the sample is small relative to the number of cross-section units. See Nickell (1981) for a computation of this bias when the length of the sample is small and the number of units goes to infinity. The sample to be used here, however, is moderately long.
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The regression coefficients can be used to compute the basic level of g in the long run:
The actual long-run ratio can be obtained from equation (3) by equating ⌬g t and ε t to 0 and the cyclical variables to their average levels, and solving for g tϪ1 in the long run. The resulting ratio is
Given that (⌬y) p ϭ Ϫ(⌬y) n ϵ , g can be written as
Hence, the long-run spending/output ratio is higher than g* if there is cyclical ratcheting. Besides , the magnitude of the additional term depends positively on the amplitude of the cycle, , and negatively on ͉͉ ϭ (␤ ϩ ), which determines the speed of convergence to the long run. The higher , ␤, or , the sooner upward ratcheting is balanced by the downward effect of the higher level of spending. The likelihood of a lag between the timing of economic activities being taxed and actual tax collection makes it desirable to include also lagged cyclical variables. Hence, equation (3) is generalized as follows:
The ratcheting coefficient is now defined as ϵ (␣ 11 ϩ ␣ 12 ) Ϫ (␣ 21 ϩ ␣ 22 ). Two remarks regarding the interpretation of the estimates from this model are in order. First, an alternative rationalization of the ratcheting effect could be based on a welfare function where unemployment increases the marginal benefit from related spending at a growing rate. In this case, the amplitude of the cycle would raise the average level of optimal spending-as in equation (5). 6 However, if there are tax smoothing considerations, the permanent nature of ratcheting implies that it should not be accompanied by deficits. This interpretation seems inconsistent with the observed deficits and growing public debt during the period studied. 7 Second, the discussion above is based on the assumption that the cyclical variables are exogenous. Blanchard and Perotti (1999) have estimated, using U.S. data, small but persistent effects of government spending shocks on output. With this type of reverse causality, there should be a positive correlation between the cyclical variables and ε t , and hence the individual estimates should be biased. The important question in the present context, however, is whether the estimate of the coefficient should also be biased. Appendix A addresses this question, and the discussion can be summarized here as follows: Although individual coefficients should be biased when reverse causality is present, this is not necessarily the case for the difference ϭ ␣ 11 ϩ ␣ 12 Ϫ (␣ 21 ϩ ␣ 22 ). If (a) output growth is symmetric around the average, and, in a parallel fashion, (b) government spending affects output symmetrically, there should be no bias in the estimate of . When (a) and (b) do not hold, two opposite forces exist. Hence, if these effects do not fully offset each other, a bias may exist in an unknown direction.
III. Estimation Results
A. The Data
The panel data set used to estimate equation (6) includes the 22 OECD countries that appear in table 1. The data, from Government and Financial Statistics (GFS), are annual figures over the period 1975-1998. 8 The variable g is matched to consolidated central government spending (including interest payments), and y is represented by GDP in constant prices. The ratio g/y, however, is computed using nominal variables, as a better measure of the share of government spending in output. 9 The average growth rate, ⌬y, is country-specific, that is, (⌬y t ) p and (⌬y t ) n are the deviations of output growth in a given country from the average in the same country over the 1975-1998 period. Given that the hypothesis refers to the cyclical pattern of government spending, it is important to have large cyclical variation in the sample. The use of panel data for 22 countries contributes in this respect, for in each individual country the degree of cyclical variation during the 23-year sample is small. Output growth across countries is not strongly correlated, the average correlation across the 22 countries is 0.21.
Spending by the consolidated central government includes central government and social security funds, but 6 If unemployment exceeded the normal rate (assuming that this corresponds to (⌬y t ) n Ͻ 0), the marginal benefit from g would increase more than the absolute decline in the opposite case. Hence, cyclical fluctuations would lead to a higher average g. 7 According to Barro's (1979) tax smoothing hypothesis, because ratcheting is known in advance, a welfare-maximizing government should raise the tax rate at the beginning of the planning period, generating an initial surplus. 8 There are some changes in the GFS definitions during the sample period, two of the major changes being for Japan, 1991, and Greece, 1991. All the regressions reported in the paper exclude 1991 for these two countries. All other changes (in 8 out of more than 400 data points) are minor. Excluding these observations does not affect the results. 9 Alternatively, g could be computed as the ratio of spending in constant prices to output in constant prices. However, using data in constant prices implies that changes in public-sector wages-which are treated as price changes-are not captured. We prefer to match g to the total burden of government spending relative to output. excludes regional governments. 10 In terms of composition, it includes four categories: (i) government consumption, (ii) transfers and subsidies, (iii) capital expenditure, and (iv) interest payments. Table 1 shows some basic statistics from the data set. In most countries (all except the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Netherlands), the spending/GDP ratio increased during the sample period. Additionally, there is a wide heterogeneity of government spending levels: the approximate ranges are 15%-48% of GDP in 1975 and 20%-48% at the end of the sample.
B. Total Government Expenditure
The panel estimation of equation (6) includes idiosyncratic constants (␣ 0 ), which allows for computing g* for each country. 11 A GLS procedure is adopted to deal with cross-section heteroskedasticity, with weights computed from the residual variances for each country in a preliminary OLS regression. The OLS estimation is also reported. The estimates of the cyclical parameters are presented in table 2. The country-specific constants, along with the long-run implications of the model, are reported in table 3.
The results indicate the presence of cyclical ratcheting, and they can be elaborated as follows: 12
• The estimates of in the two regression forms are 1.07 and 1.19, and significantly different from 0. In what follows we refer only to the weighted-regression estimate 1.07. 13 As in the benchmark example in section II, where ϭ 1, this estimate implies that following an artificial 2-year cycle of 1% amplitude (1% above ⌬y in the first year and 1% below ⌬y in the second), the spending/output ratio is 1.07% higher than prior to the cycle. 14
• Although the estimated is close to the benchmark example, the cyclical pattern is quite different. Whereas in the example the coefficient for contractions was Ϫ1 (meaning that when output growth is lower than average, spending growth remains at the average rate), the corresponding estimate of ␣ 21 ϩ ␣ 22 is Ϫ1.77. Hence, spending growth in contractions is actually higher than normal (by 0.77% for each percentage point of output growth below ⌬y). Spending in contractions, therefore, can be described as an active Keynesian-type countercyclical policy. For expansions, the coefficient in the benchmark example was 0-implying that spending grows at the same, higher than normal rate as output-whereas the corresponding estimate of ␣ 11 ϩ ␣ 12 is Ϫ0.71. This means that spending is actually expanded by only 0.29% for each percentage point of output growth above normal. This estimate reflects sizable surpluses in expansions, rather than a balanced budget as in the benchmark example.
10 Transfers from central governments to regional governments are included in central government data. The data on spending of general government-that is, including the net additional spending of regional governments-are used in separate regressions, which are also reported. The sample in this case, however, is considerably smaller.
11 Table B1 in appendix B reports the results when the cyclical parameters are also allowed to be country-specific.
12 When the cyclical variables lagged 2 years are included, their coefficients turn out statistically insignificant. 13 An additional GLS estimation carried out is based on the possibility that omitted factors within each group of countries-Europe, Asia/Pacific and North America-are similar. The corresponding (extreme) assumption is that the residual correlations within each group are the same. A new covariance matrix was obtained by replacing the covariances (from the OLS regression) within each group by the average for that group. (The variances and the covariances across groups were left the same.) The resulting estimate of is 1.49 and statistically different from 0. The estimates from this regression are reported in Appendix D, table D1. 14 Equation (6) is also estimated with country-specific cyclical coefficients. These coefficients are reported in appendix B, table B1, along with the corresponding country-specific ratcheting coefficients. The estimates of are positive in 16 countries out of 22, but statistically significant only in 3. The low significance seems related to the small time series variation within each country. The estimation with common cyclical coefficients and fixed effects materially increases the degree of time series variation in the sample. Except for Norway, all countries exhibit contemporaneous countercyclical policy in recessions [negative coefficients on (⌬y t ) n ]. These coefficients are significant in 12 countries. However, the surpluses are not large enough to offset the deficits incurred in contractions.
• Finally, a remark is in order about the starting year of the sample for the regressions-1976 regressions- . In 1974 regressions- and 1975 , following the oil shock, there were sharp increases in government spending. Given that these were recession years, including them in the regressions would have increased the magnitude of the coefficient on contractions and the estimate of .
When data on general government-that is, including spending of local governments net of transfers from the central government, obtained from the GFS-are used, the results are similar. The results are reported in Appendix D, table D2. The estimated ratcheting coefficients are 0.736 and 0.859 for the weighted and OLS regressions, respectively, smaller than those reported in table 2, but with similar levels of statistical significance. The sample, however, is considerably smaller.
The estimates in table 2 can be used to derive the optimal long-run spending ratio g* and the accumulated ratcheting g Ϫ g* ϭ /(Ϫ), for each country in the sample. These magnitudes, computed using equations (4) and (5), are reported in table 3.
According to the estimates, the average optimal spending is 35.5% of GDP, and the average accumulated ratcheting is 2.1% of GDP.
To check the robustness of the results, we proceed as follows. First, interest payments, which depend on past events and thus cannot be considered as fiscal policy, are excluded from g. The results, not reported, are very similar to those in table 2. Second, the upward trends in unemployment and the dependency ratio during the sample, which affect spending via their impact on unemployment benefits and pension payments, are controlled for.
C. Upward Trends in Unemployment and the Dependency Ratio
Unemployment has an upward trend during the sample period. Therefore, part of the upward drift in the spending/ output ratio can be expected to be related to increasing unemployment benefit payments, and hence we control here for these developments. Given the strong correlation between actual unemployment and output growth, the Hodrick-Prescott trend of unemployment-computed for each country separately-is used in the regression. The dependency ratio, defined as the population over 65 years old divided by the working age population, also increased during the sample period. The data on this ratio are available only through 1995. Table 4 reports the regressions that include these two additional variables.
The first regression includes the first differences of both the unemployment trend and the dependency ratio. In the second regression only the unemployment trend is included. The unemployment trend is statistically significant, but the dependency ratio is not. The coefficients of the cyclical variables are similar to those in table 2. The estimates of are somewhat lower than in table 2, but remain significant.
IV. Expenditure Decomposition
We turn here to the disaggregated analysis of government expenditures. The three components considered are: (1) government consumption, (2) transfers and subsidies, and (3) capital expenditure. The considerations for total spending in section II are adapted here as follows. The ratio of spending in component i to output is denoted by g t i , i ϭ 1, 2, 3. The marginal benefit of spending in component i is
and the marginal cost is c i ϩ
This formulation of the cost allows for a crowding out of spending in component i by spending in others. As in the case of total spending-equation (1)-the evolution of disaggregated spending from basic considerations is described by 
Including the cyclical considerations, the empirical equations [counterparts of equation (3)] are
The results are reported in table 5. Cyclical ratcheting is found in the three components of spending, although for capital expenditure it is insignificant. 15 For government consumption, the ratcheting coefficient is 1.30, and for transfers and subsidies it is 1.63. The result in the basic regression that total spending is strongly countercyclical in contractions, is also evident in the separated regressions. The sums of the coefficients for contractions, ␣ 21 i ϩ ␣ 22 i , are Ϫ1.56, Ϫ2.08, and Ϫ1.16, for government consumption, for transfers and subsidies, and for capital expenditure, respectively. The latter is barely significantly different from 0, and insignificantly different from Ϫ1. For government consumption and for transfers and subsidies, however, the sums of the coefficients are significantly lower than Ϫ1, indicating active countercyclical spending in these two components during contractions.
Most of the cross effects are negative, as expected, but insignificantly different from 0. The cross-effects on transfers and subsidies, however, are positive, and that of capital expenditure is even significantly different from 0. We did not find a satisfactory explanation for this positive crosseffect. One may speculate that capital spending in productive infrastructure has a positive effect on economic activity, and thus on tax collection, beyond that captured by the cyclical variables. This consideration, however, should be consistent with positive effects both on government consumption and on subsidies and transfers, whereas a positive effect was found only on the latter.
V. Additional Tests
A. Government Weakness
Roubini and Sachs (1989) find a tendency to larger deficits in industrial democracies with weaker governments after 1973. Studies assessing the importance of the strength of budgetary institutions for fiscal policy outcomes include those of Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) and Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) , who identify government weakness using cabinet size.
The related hypothesis considered here is that cyclical ratcheting is higher in countries with weaker governments. For this purpose, we use a measure of government weakness of the type constructed by Roubini and Sachs (1989) , who define an index between 0 and 3 for government weakness: 0 represents a one-party majority parliamentary government, 1 represents a majority coalition government with two or three coalition partners, 2 represents a majority coalition government with four or more coalition partners, and 3 represents a minority parliamentary government. The government weakness variable used is taken from de Haan, Sturm, and Beekhuis (1999) , who apply the same method as Roubini and Sachs for all the countries in our sample (except Turkey) for the period 1979-1995. We then build a dummy variable (WEAK) which takes the value 1 when the political weakness index is higher than average (across countries and time) and 0 when it is lower than average. 16 The interaction terms between WEAK and the cyclical variables should detect additional ratcheting associated with weak governments. The dummy variable itself captures the differential g* associated with weak governments.
The results shown in table 6 do not support the existence of a relationship between cyclical ratcheting and government weakness. According to the Wald test applied to the coefficients of the interaction variables with WEAK, the hypothesis that there is an additional bias related to government weakness cannot be accepted at standard significance 15 The smaller cyclical ratcheting in capital expenditure seems related to its weaker cyclical behavior. It can be noted that, in general, the cyclical coefficients on capital expenditure are much smaller in magnitude than those on the other two categories. 16 Similar results are obtained when the government weakness index itself is used. levels. The coefficient of WEAK itself is also insignificant at standard levels. It seems, therefore, that the cyclical ratcheting phenomenon is shared by countries with different degrees of government strength. 17
B. Regime Change in the 1990s
The Maastricht Treaty, which is relevant for a large group of countries in our sample, was signed in 1991 and approved through referendums during the period 1992-1994. 18 This and other institutional arrangements that were put in place in the 1990s deal with the increasing share of government in the economy. From the point of view of the present framework, one may interpret these developments as a manifestation of the correction mechanism embedded in the dynamic equation, which leads to a stable long-run g. Alternatively, establishing such institutions can be considered a regime change, which either constrains short-sighted policies-thereby diminishing cyclical ratcheting-or changes optimal spending.
The hypothesis of a change in fiscal regime is tested by introducing interaction terms between the cyclical variables and a dummy for the period 1992-1998, D92 (or for 1994-1998, D94) and the dummy variable itself. The choice of 1992 (or 1994) is due to the Maastricht Treaty approval. The interaction with the cyclical variables tests an effective constraint to politically induced spending, and the dummy variable itself captures a change in the benefits or costs of government spending.
The results are reported in table 7. The coefficients of the dummy variables D92 and D94 are negative and significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. This result can be interpreted as a reduction in the optimal size of government spending, induced by a lower marginal benefit or a higher marginal cost. The fact that the coefficient of D94 is larger than that of D92 may indicate a gradual change as the Maastricht Treaty was approved in the different countries. The change in ratcheting behavior (change in ) is insignificant in both regressions. This suggests that the shortsighted considerations remain unchanged. Table 8 shows the implications of the coefficients of D92 and D94 for the average long-run spending/output ratios (g) across the countries in the sample. Because these coefficients are negative, the computed g values decline. For comparison, the actual average level of g at the end of the sample period is also included.
The no-dummy estimate follows from table 3. The computation using D92 yields a lower level of spending, but it is still higher than the actual figure for 1998. When D94 is used, the computed g is lower than the actual ratio in 1998.
An alternative role of the timing of the Maastricht dummy variables (1992 or 1994) is to test whether the delay in cutting expenditures after 1992 was due to a delay in implementing the guidelines, or to the recession that most countries in the sample experienced in 1992-1993. Given that the cyclical variables are included in the regression, the fact that the computed g using D94 is lower than the one using D92 supports the former interpretation.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper reports evidence that the prolonged increase in government-spending/output ratios in OECD countries after 17 The current procedure ranks all governments along one dimension. Another possibility is to address separately different types of government institutions. Persson (2001) found a ratcheting effect in parliamentary systems. 18 The countries joining the treaty are (in parenthesis we quote the date of referendum approval): Belgium (November 11, 1992) , France (September 23, 1992) , Italy (October 29, 1992) , Luxembourg (July 2, 1992), The Netherlands (December 15, 1992 ), Ireland (June 18, 1992 , Greece (July 31, 1992) , Portugal (December 10, 1992) , Spain (November 25, 1992) , Denmark (May 18, 1993) , the United Kingdom (July 23, 1998 ), Germany (October 12, 1993 ), Austria (June 12, 1994 ), Finland (October 16, 1994 ), and Sweden (November 13, 1994 . Source: Kessing's Records of World Events. 1974 is partially explained by cyclical ratcheting, whose accumulated effect is estimated as 2% of GDP. The spending/output ratio tends to increase in contractions, and its reduction in expansions is only partial. A separate analysis of the components of government expenditure indicates that although cyclical ratcheting is present in the three main components-government consumption, transfers and subsidies, and capital expenditure-it is particularly high in transfers and subsidies. The mechanism generating asymmetric behavior was discussed by Buchanan and Wagner, who stress the consequences of implementing Keynesian economic policies in a realistic environment. In such an environment, increasing spending during recessions is likely to be politically attractive. In expansions, however, a symmetric reduction of spending is hard to implement because tax revenues abound, and it may be hard to withstand interest groups lobbying to spend them.
The possibility that cyclical ratcheting reflects costbenefit considerations for increasing g seems inconsistent with the observed accompanying deficits if there are tax smoothing considerations. Because ratcheting generates permanent increases in spending, tax smoothing implies that it should be accompanied by parallel tax increases. The findings about the 1990s, shown in table 7, are also relevant in this context: A tendency to reduce the long-run size of government becomes apparent following the Maastricht Treaty, but the cyclical asymmetry is found to remain the same as in the previous period. Hence, asymmetric behavior over the cycle does not seem to be a channel for achieving a planned change in the spending/output ratio.
Ϫ1.14 and Ϫ0.18 for recessions. These estimates differ somewhat from the OLS estimates in table 2 because the present simplistic computation abstracts from fixed effects. The corresponding ratcheting coefficient is 0.72. After the substitution, the coefficients change to Ϫ0.39 and 0.39 for expansions, and Ϫ1.24 and Ϫ0.46 for recessions. The resulting ratcheting coefficient is now 0.79. Hence, the correlation with the lagged variables does not seem to affect much.
APPENDIX B APPENDIX C
Here we consider the relationship between the definition of expansions and contractions used in the paper and the alternative, standard one where expansions and contractions are defined by ⌬y t Ͼ 0 and ⌬y t Ͻ 0, respectively. The latter requirement for a contraction is more stringent: growth has to be lower than 0, rather than lower than ⌬y, which is positive. Hence, the range 0 Ͻ ⌬y t Ͻ ⌬y, which corresponds to a contraction in the paper, is included in the expansion range under the alternative definition.
To facilitate the comparison of the results with those in the paper, the main regression (table 2) is rerun with three, rather than two, ranges for output growth. The variable (⌬y t ) p is an expansion under the two definitions. The variable (⌬y t ) n is used along with the dummy variable D t , which equals 1 when 0 Ͻ ⌬y t Ͻ ⌬y (that is, low but still positive growth), and 0 when ⌬y t Ͻ 0. Hence, (⌬y t ) n ϫ D t and (⌬y t ) n ϫ (1 Ϫ D t ) subdivide the (⌬y t ) n variable. The difference between the two definitions has to do with (⌬y t ) n ϫ D t . In this paper it is considered a contraction [that is, it should affect g like (⌬y t ) n ϫ (1 Ϫ D t )], and under the alternative definition it is an expansion [that is, it should affect it like as (⌬y t ) p ]. The results, with the three ranges for output growth, are presented in table C1.
The coefficients of (⌬y t ) n ϫ D t , (low but positive growth) are more similar to the coefficients of the negative growth variable, (⌬y t ) n ϫ (1 Ϫ D t ), than to (⌬y t ) p . Using the Wald test, the hypothesis that the sum of the current and lagged (⌬y) n ϫ D coefficients equals the sum of the corresponding (⌬y) n ϫ (1 Ϫ D) coefficients cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance level. In contrast, the hypothesis that the current and lagged (⌬y) ϫ D coefficients equal those corresponding to (⌬y) p can be rejected at any reasonable significance level. One may conclude that low but positive output growth is treated by fiscal policy as a contraction, similar to periods of negative growth. In other words, the definition of expansions and contractions used here seems more appropriate for the purposes of analyzing fiscal policy than the alternative one.
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